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From Investment Screening to Investment Development: The
Impact of Canada's Foreign Investment Review Agency
(FIRA) and Investment Canada in Canada's
Technological Development
by Gordon Dewhirst * and Michael Rudiak**
I. INTRODUCTION
O f increasing importance in Canada, as elsewhere, is the question of
technological development. Increasing global interdependence, with
growth in world trade outpacing that of individual economies, and the
problems stemming from over-capacity and convergent industrial struc-
tures among OECD countries, have made the question of "global com-
petitiveness" very central. The development and application of new
technologies and processes is fundamental to the process of becoming
and/or remaining globally competitive in most industrial and many ser-
vice sectors.
Technology has also become increasingly internationalized over the
past two decades, spurred by the growth of "world products" and new
patterns of international investment flows. The United States has also
become a net importer of international direct investment and Japan a
major new source of capital exports. Paralleling these changes is the shift
in corporate strategies which has seen much of the concern over product
development and market expansion replaced by efforts directed towards
process development, and the identification of market segments and
product niches.
Today the introduction of foreign technology into Canada fre-
quently occurs through a range of entirely different avenues than it did
fifteen to twenty years ago. Cooperative strategies, such as joint-ven-
tures, licenses and other types of non-equity relationships are increas-
ingly replacing the truncated foreign manufacturing subsidiaries of the
1950's and 1960's as mechanisms for the diffusion of technology into the
Canadian economy.
The establishment of the Foreign Investment Review Agency
(FIRA) in 1974, took place before the periods of slow and negative
growth which followed, though were not entirely related to the oil shocks
of 1973-74 and 1979-80. Traditionally much of Canadian industry had
been set up behind high tariff barriers and was designed to serve domestic
* Vice-President, Investment Review, Investment Canada.
** Investment Research and Policy Division, Investment Canada.
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needs. As a result, production runs were small and product lines diverse.
Lack of specialization reduced the need for significant R&D expendi-
tures. Domestic sales were generally insufficient to support the develop-
ment of new products or techniques and, furthermore, the subsidiary's
access to cheaper foreign technology made any such development unreal-
istic from the parent company's perspective.
The decade following the FIRA's establishment was a period in
which tariff barriers were lowered. The persistent structural problems
and high levels of technological dependence in Canadian industry were
reinforced, despite the establishment of the FIRA as a screening agency.
The decade was a very sobering period. Clearly, given the FIRA's lim-
ited mandate (which did not extend to the expansion of established firms
operating in traditional areas) and the fact that policy-makers chose not
to adopt an accompanying industrial strategy, an alternative scenario
would have been highly unlikely.
In the 1980's, the emphasis on investment review has become less
central to the concern over future technological development. Two ma-
jor trends are responsible for this. The first relates to the structure of the
multinational firm (MNE), the second to the competitiveness of the over-
all technology environment. Together they suggest that a set of positive
policy instruments is required to address Canada's technology needs.
Most large American MNEs are already established in Canada. Ca-
nadian subsidiaries have increasingly become one component in a larger
system of manufacturing, marketing and financial management. The de-
sign of the subsidiary-as a semi-autonomous unit using cheap foreign-
developed technology-is becoming inappropriate and counterproduc-
tive to new global strategies. Research and development, the one func-
tion almost totally centralized in the MNE's home country, is
increasingly being conducted internationally. It is also generally recog-
nized that there has been a decrease in the importance of strategies
designed, through foreign direct investment, to extend the advantages
that firms derive from their technological lead.' Less and less, new in-
vestments take the form of 100% owned subsidiaries. Simply stated, the
MNEs monopoly on technological advance has decreased.
Recognizing this, the new Investment Canada Agency seeks to pro-
mote new strategic technology-bearing investments and relationships
which contribute to competitiveness. This development function is re-
flected in the legislation governing the Agency's mandate as well as in the
structure of the organization itself.
II. ESTABLISHING A REVIEW AGENCY
During the 1960's Canadians became increasingly concerned about
i See generally ABONYI, FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICY: THE GRAY REPORT IN THE CON-
TEXT OF: THE EIGHTIES (Aug. 1984) (This was a major theme in this Foreign Investment Review
Agency internal working document).
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the levels and potential negative effects of foreign direct investment
(FDI) in Canada, including its impact on Canada's technological devel-
opment. The economic environment of the 1960's and growing evidence
of the pervasive influence of foreign ownership and control over Cana-
dian industry fuelled these concerns.
The tremendous post-war growth in the Canadian economy was co-
incident with large inflows of direct investment, mostly from the U.S.,
and managerial/entrepreneurial inputs. While it was recognized that
this growth required capital financing that extended beyond that which
was generated internally in Canada, instances of the extraterritorial ap-
plication of U.S. law through Canadian subsidiaries, as well as the more
specific actions taken to correct the balance of payments problems in the
U.S., increased the pressure on the Canadian government to develop an
appropriate response to these concerns.
An immediate Canadian response to the U.S. balance of payments
measures was the issuance in March, 1966 of "Some Guiding Principles
of Good Corporate Behaviour for Subsidiaries in Canada of Foreign
Companies." The so-called "Winters' Guidelines"-after Trade and
Commerce Minister Robert Winters- enjoined foreign-owned subsidiar-
ies, among other things, "to develop as an integral part of the Canadian
operation wherever practicable, the technological, research and design
capability necessary to enable the company to pursue appropriate prod-
uct development programs so as to take full advantage of market oppor-
tunities domestically and abroad."2
The issuance of these guidelines and the adoption of a voluntary
reporting program to monitor performance under them was the first at-
tempt by a Canadian government to influence, in a general way, the be-
haviour of MNEs operating in Canada.
The effects of the high degree of foreign ownership and control in
Canadian industry have been extensively studied. Not surprisingly, these
studies have invariably given prominent focus to the effects on Canada's
technological development and the level of R&D spending in Canada.
Conversely, virtually all studies of Canada's performance as an industrial
innovator accord a prominent role to the behaviour of MNE subsidiaries
in Canada.' It is not the purpose of this paper to assess the conclusions
of such studies, but they are mentioned merely to underscore the link
between foreign ownership and technological development in the minds
of Canadian policy-makers and politicians.
In 1970, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau designated Revenue Minis-
ter, Herb Gray, to lead a task force to study the implications of foreign
2 Letter from the Honourable Robert H. Winters, Minister of Trade and Commerce, Canada,
to Foreign Companies' Subsidiarier in Canada (tabled in the House of Commons on March 31,
1966).
3 See, e.g., Globerman & Meredith, The Foreign Ownership--Innovation Nexus in Canada, 19
COL. J. WORLD Bus. 53 (Winter 1984).
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investment for the Canadian economy and to recommend policies that
would ensure that such investment would be responsive to Canada's eco-
nomic and social goals in the future. The report of that task force, For-
eign Direct Investment in Canada,-better known as the Gray Report-
was released in 1972. It recommended, among other things, the estab-
lishment of a review agency for FDI entering Canada.
Central to this report was the view of foreign "truncated" subsidiar-
ies operating according to logic, motives, and principles which entailed
costs for the Canadian economy. Studies had shown convincingly that
foreign firms relied heavily on imported products and services, conducted
little R&D and generated few export earnings. The report concluded
that foreign-controlled subsidiaries hampered indigenous technological
development in Canada due to the characteristics of the parent-subsidi-
ary relationship. For obvious reasons of cost, efficiency and control,
multinational firms (MNEs) tended towards centralized research and de-
velopment. The R&D conducted by their subsidiaries in Canada was
done according to proportions far inferior to that of the parent-and
then, often only to modify existing technologies to the local market needs
rather than to generate innovation as such.
There was no implicit dogmatic in the logic of the report. It recog-
nized that "the essential need for economic development is not necessar-
ily extensive indigenous technological output, but rather a capacity to use
technology effectively, whether it is domestic or imported."4 Given Can-
ada's maintenance of an exogenous rather than internally generated dy-
namic of technological development and the fact that Canada was likely
to remain an important importer of technology, measures were needed to
ensure that value was received for the price Canadians paid for imported
technology. The rationale of the report's findings was expressed in very
clear terms. "[T]hrough both tax and grant incentives, the government
has explicitly encouraged expenditure on research and development in
private business. Notwithstanding these measures, the record of indige-
nous technological output has remained poor and Canada's dependence
upon the outside world has, in fact been increasing."' The report also
stated that:
In general, as stated, the benefits have been such that Canada could
not have realistically lived without them. But this does not mean that
the imported technology has necessarily entered Canada in the best
form .... In other words the main question at issue is not whether, on
the whole, the benefits outweigh the costs, but whether, in particular
cases, direct investment is the best form for Canada to obtain the for-
eign technology and whether the price being paid is a reasonable one.6
It was emphasized that importing technology may have been very
4 GOV'T OF CANADA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA at 120 (1972).
5 Id. at 116.
6 Id. at 116.
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economical for Canada in certain circumstances, depending on the rela-
tive costs and benefits involved. Given that Canada tended to import
proportionately more technology than virtually all other OECD coun-
tries, it was recognized, however, that Canadian interests were not
shared by the foreign firms active in Canada:
[The MNE's] concern is to maximize his return and this will not neces-
sarily result in a transfer at a fair price or in an appropriate form for
Canada. While the availability of foreign technology has, in general,
clearly been essential for the Canadian economy, the method of trans-
fer has typically been dictated largely by the objectives and interests of
the foreign proprietor. Nothing in the Canadian environment militates
against this procedure.7
The Gray report recognized that Canada's low technological output was
a reflection of the economic history and environment, a legacy of tradi-
tional Canadian policies of high tariffs.
The report also expressed the fear that the absence of an indigenous
technological capacity would lead to an industrial structure which fur-
ther reflected the priorities of those outside Canada.' Therefore, to help
reduce the truncation of Canadian business decision-making and business
operations in general, and bearing in mind the fact that Canada could not
afford significant R&D expenditures in all areas (referred to as "lines of
production" in the report), the report recommended that it be the task of
an industrial development strategy to identify those areas where Can-
ada's efforts could be concentrated. Industry, Trade and Commerce
Minister, Alastair Gillespie, explained the government's interpretation:
The [review process] is a necessary part, I submit, of over-all industrial
strategy or industrial policy. General economic policies or incentives
are not enough. They cannot by themselves, adequately ensure fulfill-
ment of certain of our economic goals such as diversification of exports
and export markets, and increased Canadian innovativeness and deci-
sion-making capability. To rely solely on investment incentives seems
to me to be ingenuous and extremely naive. 9
Of the many proposals considered by the government during the 1970's,
which were aimed at addressing the problems of truncated manufactur-
ing in Canada, the establishment of the FIRA in 1974 was one of the few
carried out.
FIRA was established with a view to increasing the benefits of FDI
in Canada and decreasing the costs which accompany it "getting a better
deal." The underlying assumption was that, through negotiation, firms
could be persuaded to alter their investment plans (such as R&D spend-
7 Id. at 117.
8 Id. at 130.
9 HOUSE OF COMMONS, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on
Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs, June 5, 1973, (Issue 26) at 6. (Hereinafter Minutes from the
Committee on Finance, Trade, and Economic Affairs.]
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ing) if, as formulated, they did not measure up to the test of "significant
benefit" to Canada. Five performance oriented factors were established
to enable the agency to determine what constituted "significant benefit."
As Minister Gillespie explained before a committee of the House of
Commons, they were economic and the judgement was to be made on
these, not on cultural, social or political grounds.'° The five criteria, or
factors-which included the effect of an investment on "productivity, in-
dustrial efficiency, technological development, and product innova-
tion"-were aimed at the long-term restructuring of the Canadian
economy, recognizing the important role FDI had to play in this process.
The legislation creating the FIRA proposed to extend the screening
mechanism into three areas: foreign takeovers, the establishment of new
businesses by foreigners not presently doing business in Canada, and the
establishment of new businesses in other sectors by foreign-controlled
firms already in Canada. This excluded the Gray Report's recommenda-
tion that the expansion of already established firms in related activities be
screened. The Minister explained the reasons behind this. "The govern-
ment did consider expansion of existing businesses and rejected it on the
basis that it would be such a massive intervention in the economy, that it
was not acceptable."' l"
Uniquely, Canada is a country with the fastest growing labor force
in the world and it would not want to adopt a set of policies which would
inhibit the expansion of business. We have been doing everthing we can
to try to get firms to expand their business and to support them in new
markets. If we introduce the screening process as far as expansion in
existing foreign-controlled business in Canada is concerned, we would
impede that objective.' 2
III. ASSESSING FIRA's IMPACT
In any assessment of the FIRA's impact on Canada's technological
development, it is useful to begin by clarifying the scope of the Agency's
mandate and the nature of the review process as both of these had an
important bearing on the potential impact.
As noted above, the FIRA review process applied only to invest-
ments by non-Canadians to establish new businesses in Canada or to ac-
quire existing Canadian businesses. It did not apply to investments to
expand existing foreign-owned businesses which account for by far the
larger part of the growth of foreign investment in Canada. Of course the
legislation did not apply to investments by Canadians. Thus, in terms of
total investment activity in Canada, the FIRA was operating at the mar-
10 Minutes from the Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs, supra note 9, (June 7,
1972) at 17.
11 Minutes from the Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs, supra note 9, at 19.
12 Minutes from the Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs supra note 10, at 27.
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gin and for this reason along the potential impact was probably quite
limited.
A second important qualification concerns the nature of the invest-
ments reviewed. During the eleven year period that the Foreign Invest-
ment Review (FIR) Act was in force, FIRA reviewed (allowed-
disallowed) a total of 6,599 investment proposals. Roughly 58% of these
investments were in the service and construction sectors of the economy.
Only a relatively small percentage of investments were in technology-
intensive manufacturing sectors, where the review process might have
offered significant scope for influencing the level of R&D spending.
Moreover, most of the investments reviewed under the Act were rela-
tively small. Of all proposals to establish new businesses, 91% involved
investments of less than two million dollars (Can). Of acquisitions re-
viewed, 73% involved businesses with assets of less than five million dol-
lars (Can).
The review process has been widely perceived as a negotiating pro-
cess in which the FIRA sought to increase benefits to Canada as a condi-
tion of government approval. In reality, the agency was primarily
engaged in screening investments to determine whether or not they were
likely to be of benefit to Canada. While the FIRA frequently engaged in
negotiations with investors, those negotiations were often primarily con-
cerned with clarifications of the investor's plans and the translation of
these plans into specific written commitments. Less frequently, the nego-
tiations were directed towards changing an investor's plans to increase
technological or other benefits of the investment. A further qualification
on the impact of the review process was noted in a published assessment
of the first five years of operation under the FIR Act.
Even more difficult problems of measurement arise in attempting
to assess the effects of the review process itself on the benefits to Can-
ada of allowed investments. In essence this involves a judgement, in
each case, as to what would have happened if there were no screening
and negotiation of investment conditions: what differences would
there have been in the investor's plans and the manner in which they
were implemented? These are hypothetical questions and the answers
are clearly not susceptible to positive verification. Experience with the
review process indicates that, generally speaking, its greatest impact is
in reducing the degree of truncation and increasing the autonomy of
Canadian subsidiaries.
But, since the purpose of the review process is not to persuade
investors to pursue unprofitable courses of action ... there can be no
certainty that changes in an investor's plans made as a result of negoti-
ations during the review process would not have been made anyway, at
least in part, in response to ordinary market forces, as the investment
matured. 13
13 GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW AcT, SUPPLEMENT TO THE
1978-79 ANNUAL REPORT, at 2 (available from Supply and Services, Canada, Ottawa).
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With these important reservations about both the potential and ac-
tual impact of the FIRA, one may turn to the extent and scope of techno-
logical benefits that accompanied investments reviewed by the FIRA.
These have taken a variety of forms. They included the expansion of
existing R&D facilities in Canada on the establishment of new ones, ac-
cess to the R&D and technological "know-how" of a foreign parent, the
introduction of advanced technology associated with new production
processes, new machinery or new products and support for research in-
stitutes in Canada.
In assessing an investor's plans for technological development, the
agency sought to ensure that the Canadian business would be permitted
to use the results of its R&D in the most effective way. Thus, important
elements of R&D plans and commitments concerned the authority given
to the Canadian company to explore new high-technology product op-
portunities, to manufacture any products it developed, and to market
them on a world-wide basis. In some instances, where corporate technol-
ogy-sharing arrangements precluded complete R&D autonomy, investors
were encouraged to give their Canadian subsidiary exclusive corporate
responsibility for R&D, manufacturing, and world-wide marketing of
specific products, groups of products, or product lines.
In other cases, where the Canadian company's operations did not
warrant the establishment of separate R&D facilities, similar benefits
were obtained through commitments to engage independent Canadian
research laboratories to undertake research on a contract basis. Through
its access to government computerized listings of specialized R&D capa-
bilities in Canada, FIRA was able to assist investors in locating research
facilities to best meet their needs.
A particularly important arrangement through which technological
benefits accrue to the Canadian economy is in the assignment to the Ca-
nadian subsidiary of a "world product mandate" (WPM). A WPM in-
volves specialized production for the global market by a subsidiary in
Canada. Typically, the benefits of a WPM are of two sorts: On the
macro level, the granting of a WPM contributes to increased competi-
tiveness in the economy through a more efficient utilization of domestic
resources and a shift into higher value-added production. On the micro
level, a WPM requires individual firms to take on an expanded and out-
ward orientation and in doing so, also encourages supplier firms to be-
come cost-effective vis-a-vis foreign-based component suppliers.14
The assignment of a WPM increases the specialization and scale-
and hence the overall efficiency-of production operations. Such activity
is important to technological development because, unlike branch plants,
firms granted some form of product or process mandate tend to have
significant product modification for international markets. This usually
14 SCIENCE COUNCIL OF CANADA, MULTINATIONALS AND INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY: THE
ROLE OF WORLD PRODUCT MANDATES II (1980).
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requires the establishment of specific R&D facilities with engineering,
design and marketing capabilities.15 This latter benefit is significant be-
cause it has the potential of offering a high degree of autonomy to the
subsidiary in the research area. It also increases the scope for spin-offs
related to new technologies developed.
Among the investments reviewed by FIRA, roughly fifty involved
plans to assign a world or regional (e.g. North American) product man-
date to the Canadian subsidiary. Production arrangements of this kind
were noticeably more frequent in the past five years than they were in the
first five years of investment screening by FIRA. The majority of the
WPM's were in the automotive, electronics, aerospace, and machinery
sectors.
Technological benefits in one form or another were identified in
roughly two-fifths of all investments approved under the FIR Act. This
figure is not surprising since, as noted above, many of the investments
reviewed were very small and a large percentage were in the service sec-
tors of the economy, offering little scope for technology-related benefits.
Very little quatitative date is available on the technological benefits that
accompanied investments reviewed by the FIRA. In part this is because
such benefits are not readily quantifiable. The agency did compile data
on planned R&D expenditures by investors whose proposals were al-
lowed. During the FIRA's existence-from April 1974 to June 1985-
such planned R&D expenditures amounted to just under $940 million
(Can). Over the same period, R&D spending by all businesses in Canada
was estimated at about $16.7 billion (Can) according to Statistics
Canada.
The New Thrust of Investment Policy
As already noted, the international investment environment has
changed substantially over the last ten years. Many, if not most, of the
changes had a basis in new applications of technology and increased in-
ternational competition. Investment in Canada, as in other OECD coun-
tries, has become increasingly concentrated in production and trade in
sectors dominated by product and systems innovations, both of which
result from organized research, development and design. The innova-
tions which result are not limited to the introduction of exotic
technologies:
They also permit a shift in emphasis within sectors: towards product
novelty, quality and reliability, and automated assembly in durable
consumer goods; towards high value added materials in chemical and
other intermediate products; and towards the growing incorporation of
electronics in capital goods.16
15 Id.
16 ABONYI, supra note 1, at 10.
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Established manufacturing processes, emphasizing long product life-
cycles, are declining. High volume systems, using robotics and com-
puters, are being built to give factories increased flexibility. Custom
products are in demand and, as mentioned earlier, the number of cases
where a given firm enjoys a substantial technological lead over its com-
petitors are becoming less frequent. The rationale for establishing 100
percent-owned subsidiaries is no longer current. The capital intensidy of
R&D has prompted firms to share costs and pool their human resources.
The emerging trend in international investment, according to a recent
OECD study, "seems to be a tendency towards flexible and pragmatic
forms of ownership, management and control inside increasingly com-
plex arrangements, often involving several forms of control, cross-control
or joint activities." 17
Joint ventures, in particular, allow knowledge-intensive firms to
market their technology abroad, earning the necessary revenues for new
R&D. Joint ventures are attractive because they provide immediate ac-
cess to other technologies and permit greater control over exports than
other arrangements, such as licensing. With new emphasis on cost re-
duction rather than activity expansion and the search for market generat-
ing new processes and product innovations, they are often the only
competitive avenue for new investment.
The application of new technology is fundamental to increased com-
petitiveness. Given existing trade barriers and global marketing of prod-
ucts and sourcing of components, there is a need to encourage joint
international R&D and commercial ventures. As the share of manufac-
tured exports represented by technology-intensive products increases, the
measure of R&D expenditures as a percentage of total value added will
progressively increase.18 A recent internal study conducted by Canada's
Federal Department of Science and Technology "showed that for both
industry groups and individual industries in Canada the increase in value
added, total shipments, employment, and labor productivity are greater
the higher the research intensity of the group or industry."19
The application of new and existing technologies to the area of Can-
ada's historical comparative advantage (i.e. resources) will also permit,
through greater productivity and flexibility, increased value-added pro-
duction and strengthened competitiveness. A stronger high-technology
sector and a more specialized and competitive manufacturing sector will
also lessen Canada's dependence on the resource sector in maintaining a
17 OECD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES GROUP, RE-
CENT INT'L. DIRECT INVESTMENT TRENDS 33 (1981).
18 See OECD, TRADE IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS: AN INITIAL CONTRIBUTION TO
THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF TRADE PATTERNS IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS,
DSTI/Spr/84-66, DSTI/IND/84.60 (Jan. 1985).
19 MINISTRY OF STATE FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, CANADIAN TRADE IN HIGH TECH-
NOLOGY: AN ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AND PROSPECTS (Aug. 1985) at 25.
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healthy balance-of-payments position during the current period of low
demand and high supply.
By 1985, those changes indicated the need for a new Canadian in-
vestment policy. The FIR Act with its underlying emphasis on the costs
of foreign investment, and some suspicion of its motives, was replaced by
Investment Canada Act (IC Act), which explicitly recognized the bene-
fits that can accrue from investment, particularly when accompanied by
new technology. This IC Act established a new agency, Investment Can-
ada, with a mandate to encourage and facilitate investments. Although a
review mechanism was retained under the new Act, it applies only to a
small proportion of foreign investment. For example, the establishment
of new businesses is exempt from review, except in specified culturally
sensitive activities. For the few significant investments by non-Canadian
that are subject to review, the review process has been substantially
simplified.
It may be of some interest to note that when the new Act was being
introduced, there was some considerable pressure, particularly from the
scientific and high tech communities, to extend the review to small high
tech. Such an extension was rejected on the grounds that it would defeat
the purpose of attracting new technological investments.
For those investments still subject to review, the effect of the invest-
ment on "productivity, industrial efficiency, technological development
and product efficiency" remains a factor in the assessment of benefit, just
as under the FIR Act. Indeed, the importance of that element was em-
phasized in two recent cases. In approving the acquisition of Mitel Cor-
poration, a Canadian electronic telecommunications equipment
manufacturer, by British Telecom, Investment Canada Minister Sinclair
Stevens noted that Mitel's R&D activities would remain in Canada.
Similarly, when Deere & Company acquired the agrigultural equip-
ment group of Versatile Corporation, the Minister emphasized that "all
existing technologies, patents and licenses as they relate to products man-
ufactured in Canada, as well as the reponsibility for research and devel-
opment and product design would continue to reside in Canada." The
emphasis in the Minister's statement on those commitments to maintain
technological development in Canada raises the question of whether the
transactions would have been readly approved without them.
However, as noted above, the ability of the review mechanism to
influence technological development is limited to the few cases that are
subject to it. Generally it is through its positive mandate to exploit op-
portunities for investment and technological advancement that a signifi-
cant contribution will be made by Investment Canada.
In carrying out its positive mandate, Investment Canada acts as a
catalyst to the efforts of federal, provincial and private sector initiatives.
Recognizing that the application of new technology is fundamental to
increased competitiveness, not only in manufacturing, but also in the re-
11
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source and services sectors, a priority of the agency is to encourage
greater innovation and the use of more technology in Canada. It accom-
plishes this objective through a variety of means, including promotion,
the identification of new sources of competitive technology-bearing in-
vestment, and the encouragement of new investment articles, such as li-
censing or joint ventures. In connection with joint ventures, it might be
noted that the rules for determining the status of an investor under the
new Act exempt many such arrangements from review.
The net effect of Investment Canada's proactive measures are, of
course, yet to be measured. However, its emphasis on the role of tech-
nology and benefits, as well, rather than on the costs of foreign invest-
ment, will surely contribute to the goal of making Canadian business
more competitive and efficient.
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